Climbing Down the Ladder: Inwardness and Abstraction in Wittgenstein\u27s Philosophy with Reference to Kierkegaard by Hoelle \u2705, Lisa
Illinois Wesleyan University
Digital Commons @ IWU
Honors Projects Philosophy
2005
Climbing Down the Ladder: Inwardness and
Abstraction in Wittgenstein's Philosophy with
Reference to Kierkegaard
Lisa Hoelle '05
Illinois Wesleyan University
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Ames Library, the Andrew W. Mellon Center for Curricular and Faculty
Development, the Office of the Provost and the Office of the President. It has been accepted for inclusion in Digital Commons @ IWU by
the faculty at Illinois Wesleyan University. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@iwu.edu.
©Copyright is owned by the author of this document.
Recommended Citation
Hoelle '05, Lisa, "Climbing Down the Ladder: Inwardness and Abstraction in Wittgenstein's Philosophy with Reference to
Kierkegaard" (2005). Honors Projects. Paper 6.
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/phil_honproj/6
-Climbing Down the Ladder:
 
Inwardness and Abstraction in Wittgenstein's Philosophy with Reference to Kierkegaard
 
Lisa Hoelle, Honors Research in Philosophy, April 19th, 2005 
•
 
2 
I. Introduction 
Both S0ren Kierkegaard and Ludwig Wittgenstein argued that there are some 
truths, located beyond the boundaries of rational understanding, which cannot be 
communicated directly to others. Wittgenstein was influenced by his reading of 
Kierkegaard's texts on these matters, and accordingly he, like Kierkegaard, has a place in 
his philosophy for the importance of inwardness in knowing paradoxical truths. A move 
of 'inwardness,' for Kierkegaard, is an action that requires a personal and absolute belief 
that can't be explained directly to others, while 'paradoxical truths', as Kierkegaard uses 
the phrase, refers to propositions that we regard as incomprehensible but true (one of his 
examples is the claim that Christ is both fully God and fully human). For Kierkegaard, 
we express inwardness when we actively and fully invest ourselves in believing a 
paradox. It is clear that Wittgenstein also believed that we can understand some things in 
a non-standard, non-objective way. The passages in which he discusses this kind of non­
objective understanding, however, are notoriously obscure. 
In this paper, I look to Kierkegaard's philosophy for insight as to what 
Wittgenstein is saying in these passages. One familiar place where Wittgenstein 
discusses this form of non-standard, non-objective understanding is in the Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus: 
My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who 
understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has 
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used them - as steps - to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, 
throwaway the ladder after he has climbed up it.)l 
Wittgenstein's ladder analogy returns, years later, in Culture and Value: 
I might say, if the place I want to reach could only be climbed up to by a 
ladder, I would give up trying to get there. For the place to which I really 
have to go is one that I must actually be at already. Anything that can be 
reached with a ladder does not interest me.2 
I will show how Kierkegaard's philosophy sheds light on these difficult passages. I also 
will show how Wittgenstein's views on non-objective truth fit into his overall 
philosophy, and how they affect his view of the philosophy of his contemporaries. 
II. Kierkegaard: Subjective and Objective Understanding 
We can begin to understand Wittgenstein's views by first looking at 
Kierkegaard's distinction between subjective and objective understanding. Having 
subjective knowledge or subjective understanding, according to Kierkegaard, is to be in a 
relation to truth. I will sometimes refer to this simply as 'relating to truth.' While it is 
difficult to determine what subjective knowledge amounts to, to the extent that we can 
discuss it, it will be useful in understanding Wittgenstein. 
In Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard attempts to answer the 
question of how truth that is essentially related to the subject's existence (henceforth 
1 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Trans. D. F. Pears & B.F. McGuinness. New 
York, N.Y.: Routledge Classics, 2001. 6.54 
2 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Culture and Value: A Selection from the Posthumous Remains. Trans. Peter 
Winch. Ed. G. H. von Wright. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing, 1998. IDe. 
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referred to as "essential truth," as Kierkegaard used the term) can be reached.3 Essential 
truth is subjective truth. Kierkegaard's primary example of this type of truth is the claim 
that Christ was simultaneously God and man. He explains that one must reach these 
essential truths subjectively rather than objectively because we are existing beings. Since 
essential truths are paradoxical, we must constantly reaffirm our absolute belief in them 
at every moment. Thus, the claim that Christ was both God and man necessarily relates 
to our existence in time because we are required at every moment to reaffirm the truth of 
it. Kierkegaard maintains that it is often the case that we do not pay adequate attention to 
the implications of our existence in time in considering essential truths. 
We are existing beings, by which Kierkegaard means that we are in the process of 
becoming: our temporality entails that we are constantly in a state of flux. Nonetheless, 
we often regard ourselves as complete and unchanging at given moments. When we do, 
we also regard our relation to other things as static. In effect, we are abstracting 
ourselves from time. In other words, we understand that we are developing throughout 
our lives, yet we consider ourselves complete at any given moment. For Kierkegaard, 
there is a tension between the abstract form of being and the concrete form of being. 
When we abstract the concept of our concrete being, i.e. the concept of ourselves as 
existing persons changing in time, we momentarily disregard our temporality and flux, 
and we think of truth as something complete or finished. Kierkegaard holds that when 
we consider ourselves as non-temporal, we consider our thoughts and the state of affairs 
in the world as static. Since truth is static, it can be understood as a complete, 
unchanging identity between a thought and a state of affairs. Kierkegaard maintains that 
3 Kierkegaard, S0ren. Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments. Volume I. Trans. 
Howard V. Hong & Edna H. Hong. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992. 189. 
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this abstract, static, form of truth does not always apply to us as existing beings, however. 
We exist in time, and cannot abstract our temporal existence from ourselves. Even if we 
tried, we would still be existing in time. Since subjective truth relates essentially to 
existence, we must take into account the constant change inherent in us because of our 
existence in time. 
Our development through time and our completeness at each moment forces us to 
consider two ways in which we relate to truth: through objective reflection and subjective 
reflection. Kierkegaard writes: 
To objective reflection, truth becomes something objective, an object, and 
the point is to disregard the subject. To subjective reflection, truth 
becomes appropriation, inwardness, subjectivity, and the point is to 
immerse oneself, existing, in subjectivity.4 
The distinction between the two kinds of reflection is apparent, but as we relate to truth in 
both ways, we can only seek to overcome this distinction through objective reflection or 
subjective reflection. For Kierkegaard, mediation, a solution proposed by Hegel in 
which our objective and subjective relations to truth merge, is not a viable option. 5 
Mediation fails because it turns truth into what Kierkegaard calls a "subject-object" 6 
both a subject engaged in a dynamic relationship with the knower and a static object to be 
grasped intellectually and held onto without any continued effort on the part of the 
knower. In other words, mediation presupposes movement (the dynamic relation) as part 
of truth, but still attempts to abstract truth (the static relation). In abstraction nothing 
changes, so the movement that is presupposed by mediation is denied. This leads to a 
4 Ibid. 192. 
5 It is not the focus of my paper to discuss Kierkegaard's response to Hegel's theory. Because of this and 
for the sake of brevity, I will not discuss it in any depth. 
6 Ibid. 192. 
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contradiction in that truth must relate to us, in time, abstractly. Essential truth relates to 
the knower, but the knower is existing, so truth cannot be an abstract relation. It is 
impossible for us, as knowers, to abstract ourselves out of existence. 
Since mediation is not an option for reconciling the objective and subjective 
relations we have to truth, we must go back to objective reflection and subjective 
reflection to determine if either will allow us to transcend our existence so that we can 
attain truth in its complete and abstract sense as well as in relation to ourselves as 
temporal beings. Kierkegaard maintains that since we are existing persons, the way to 
achieve essential truths is "the one that especially accentuates what it means to exist."? 
He turns fIrst to objective reflection. In seeking to understand truth objectively, a person 
attempts to dismiss the fact that she is dynamic and so her relation to truth is always 
changing. Thus, the existence of the subject, i.e. the existence of the individual seeking 
truth, is left out of the picture. While Kierkegaard recognizes that abstract thinking and 
objective validity have their place as useful tools in subjects like math and history, he 
holds that one cannot relate to essential truths through objective understanding. The 
subject cannot become completely indifferent to her own existence, so this objective 
attempt will fail at reaching essential truth. Since we exist in time, the only way we can 
come to this type oftruth is as beings in time; therefore, we can't come to essential truth 
by abstracting truth and ourselves. More simply stated, we are not abstract, and so the 
fact that we exist and are constantly changing cannot be dismissed as accidental in our 
struggles to stand in relation to an essential truth. 
Subjective reflection aims in the opposite direction of objective reflection. 
Kierkegaard thinks that while in objective reflection a person seeks to remove herself as 
7 Ibid. 193. 
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an existing being from the truth she hopes to capture by declaring herself to be a subject 
only accidentally, in subjective reflection she focuses on herself as an existing being and 
on her own relationship to truth. We might depict objective reflection as looking at the 
state of affairs in the world from an atemporal place outside the world and subjective 
reflection as looking at the world while also constantly looking at one's changing 
relationship within it, where reaffirmation of one's belief is always needed. Similarly, 
the person seeking subjective knowledge is not allowed to deny her existence. 
Kierkegaard holds that the fact that a person exists temporally means, at its most 
fundamental level, that her self is in flux, that she is in constant change or motion. In 
recognizing this, we can see that truth, for us, as the agreement of being and thinking, 
cannot be reached since flux is inherent in our being. Just as we cannot grasp our 
relationship to an object that constantly changes without abstracting that object, so we 
cannot grasp our relation to truth while we are constantly in flux. 
Kierkegaard stresses the paradox involved in our search for truth: "truth as the 
identity of thought and being is therefore a chimera of abstraction and truly only a 
longing of creation.,,8 Through subjective reflection one realizes that we cannot attain 
essential truths as temporal beings; the nature of temporality prevents us from grasping 
truth as a relation to the self, since we would be grasping at something that is always 
changing. It is only in the atemporal realm that one could have a relationship to essential 
truth that can be reached absolutely, since the relation oftruth to atemporal beings would 
be immutable. But since we are not atemporal beings, this entails (1) that abstracting 
truth as a relation to the self will not work, for we could only grasp abstract truth if we 
were abstract beings, and in abstracting ourselves our existence, i.e. half of the dialectic 
8 Ibid. 196. 
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of essential truth, vanishes; and (2) that reaching truth as a temporal being is also an 
impossibility, since our relation to truth is always changing. 
III. Kierkegaard: Christian Truth as a Question of Subjective Truth 
When Wittgenstein remarks that "The believer's relation to these messages [of the 
Gospels] is neither a relation of historical truth (probability) nor yet that to a doctrine 
consisting of 'truths of reason, ",9 he echoes Kierkegaard in rejecting the idea that the 
essential truths can be understood objectively. Wittgenstein maintains that we can reach 
essential truths through subjective understanding. But Kierkegaard has denied this in my 
explanation of his theory so far. However, despite the incomprehensibility of 
subjectively understanding truth Kierkegaard will argue, as I explain next, that it is 
ultimately through absolute subjectivity that one can overcome the distinction between 
our objective relation to truth and our subjective relation to truth that has caused so much 
trouble for those seeking to relate to essential truth. 
For Kierkegaard, we can only stand in relation to an essential truth by 
transcending the dialectic of our selves. He believes that we are both always changing 
through time and complete at each individual moment, during which times we regard our 
relation to things as static. These two elements are contradictory, and so we must bring 
together the temporal and eternal, or the finite and infinite, elements within ourselves. If 
a person were to achieve this, she would be eternal and infinite while simultaneously 
existing in time as a particular. Kierkegaard believes that this fusion of the finite and 
9 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Culture and Value: A Selection from the Posthumous Remains. Trans. Peter 
Winch. Ed. G. H. von Wright. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing, 1998. 38e. 
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infinite can be achieved only in a moment of passion, i.e. a moment of absolute belief. 
He remarks, "At its highest, inwardness in an existing subject is passion; truth as a 
paradox corresponds to passion, and that truth becomes a paradox is grounded precisely 
in its relation to an existing subject."IO In believing absolutely, one focuses completely 
on her relation to truth and all things objective fade away. For Kierkegaard, this absolute 
subjectivity is achieved in a moment of faith, by being faithful. It is only through 
paradox that we can have faith, for faith requires that one believe two things despite the 
fact that they contradict each other. One believes, while fully aware of the contradiction 
involved and in spite of it, in essential truth. Kierkegaard maintains that in faith one 
unites the infinity and finitude ofthe self, which is paradoxical. This move is one of 
inwardness, it requires a personal and absolute belief that cannot be explained directly to 
others. If you tried to explain your belief in a paradox, others would ask you to give 
reasons for your belief to help them understand, and you could not do so because 
rationality and reason are opposed to your belief. If essential truth, or if this move of 
faith, could be communicated directly, one could come to grasp it objectively, which 
Kierkegaard thinks is impossible. Kierkegaard's view that some truths are in this sense 
ineffable is important for understanding what Wittgenstein is doing in the Tractatus. 
In Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard considers Christianity as an 
essential and paradoxical truth. In seeking Christian truth objectively, one rationally 
understands that the atemporal, omniscient, and omnipotent being at the center of 
Christianity is God. The objective thinker will not be able to objectively understand God 
as essential truth in spite of her best efforts. The person seeking objective knowledge 
10 Kierkegaard, S0ren. Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments. Volume 1. Trans. 
Howard V. Hong & EdnaH. Hong. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992. 199. 
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dismisses the fact that she is temporal and changing. In doing so, she dismisses the fact 
that she is existing and, consequently, it is not possible for the subject to relate to 
essential truth, since this truth relates essentially to the subject's existence, which she is 
attempting to deny. 
Subjectively, truth is the relation of God to the self. This, in itself, is a problem as 
it asserts that truth is the eternal relating to the existing. For Kierkegaard, the paradox 
lies here, and it is only through faith, i.e. absolute inwardness or subjectivity, that one can 
stand in relation to subjective truth. He maintains that faith allows you to open yourself 
to the idea that God, as infinite and eternal, relates to individual persons, who are finite 
and temporal, while being fully aware that this relation is not possible. This paradoxical 
relation is embodied by Jesus, who we understand simultaneously as God and man, 
infinite and finite, and eternal and temporal. In faith, you realize the paradoxical nature 
of these incompatible properties, but believe absolutely nonetheless. 
IV. Wittgenstein on Christian Truth as a Question of Subjective Truth 
Wittgenstein held that there are certain truths that lie beyond the boundaries of 
reason. He regarded these truths as paradoxical in nature, and concluded that if they can 
be understood at all they must be understood non-objectively. He cites Christianity as an 
example. In Christianity, we encounter numerous paradoxes in its most basic premises as 
well as a host of contradictions within Biblical texts. The paradoxical truth most 
fundamental to the Christian belief system is the idea of God as man. Logically, one 
cannot be both an eternal entity and a temporal creature, but Christ is said to be just that. 
• 
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Despite this effrontery to our rationality, though, Christ is regarded as the paradigm we 
should aspire to imitate. 
Although the conception of Christianity Wittgenstein outlines in Culture and 
Value is influenced by Kierkegaard, it is not rigorously developed, and Wittgenstein does 
not draw attention to our present-day lack of faith as Kierkegaard does. Instead, 
Wittgenstein focuses on why Christian truths are difficult to understand. After noting 
Kierkegaard's view that Christianity is not supposed to be easy, 11 Wittgenstein has a 
third party ask why the Scripture is so unclear. The third party points out that if someone 
faced a dangerous situation, we wouldn't try to help by reciting riddles. Instead, we 
would make our instructions as explicit as possible. Shouldn't the Bible be as explicit as 
possible in order to save those in danger from the perils inherent in misunderstanding 
Christianity? Wittgenstein replies that this is the wrong way of looking at the Scripture. 
Perhaps, if the Scripture is unclear, it is because it could not be made more explicit. It is 
possible that Christianity, in being more direct, would only lead Christians further from 
the truth they seek. 
Ifwe are to find the truth in Christianity, Wittgenstein maintains, we cannot take 
the Bible as expressing historical truths: 
Christianity is not based on a historical truth, but presents us with a 
(historical) narrative & says: now believe! But not believe this report with 
the belief that is appropriate to a historical report, - but rather: believe, 
through thick & thin & you can do this only as the outcome of a life. 12 
11 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Culture and Value: A Selection from the Posthumous Remains. Trans. Peter
 
Winch. Ed. G. H. von Wright. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing, 1998. 36e.
 
12 Ibid. 37e.
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Wittgenstein is using Kierkegaard's distinction between objective and subjective 
knowledge here. Objective knowledge, in this sense, is the knowledge a person would 
have if her views corresponded with reality. We have subjective knowledge when we 
realize that we cannot reach truth as an identity between our conception of how things are 
and a state of affairs, in this case the state of affairs presented in Christianity, because we 
are existing beings. This entails that, for us, a static relation between our conception of 
how things are and the actual state of affairs cannot be achieved, but is always 
developing. Although objective knowledge has its place, it is only subjectively that we 
can come to know religious truth. Since Christianity is founded on a paradoxical notion, 
we cannot seek its truth through objective reasoning. We are incapable of rationally 
understanding the contradictions in the Bible. Instead, we must strive to affirm our 
belief in Christian truth in our actions. Christianity presents people with a paradox and 
tells them to believe it to prevent them from theorizing about Christianity rather than 
practicing it. Because the Christian cannot maintain an objective perspective if she 
believes a paradox, the contradictory nature of Christianity forces her into trying to 
understand it subjectively. Subjective understanding differs from trying to grasp a thing 
intellectually; it is an adaptation of one's life to the practice of Christianity. 
v. Dissolving Philosophical Problems 
Wittgenstein investigates truths that we must reach subjectively in Kierkegaard's 
sense. While his comments on Christianity reflect this view most clearly, the 
examination of inwardness as truth appears throughout his writings when he discusses 
• 
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topics such as mysticism, indirectness, and pursuits opposed to science. One theme is 
apparent: truths of this nature are more important than we often think, particularly in the 
sciences and in philosophy. This sentiment is most apparent in Wittgenstein's statement, 
"The inexpressible (what I find enigmatic & cannot express) perhaps provides the 
background, against which whatever I was able to express acquires meaning.,,13 I now 
examine some of Wittgenstein's writings on the subject of inwardness with this passage 
in mind. 
In Culture and Value, truths that must be reached indirectly come into play in his 
discussion of pursuits opposed to science. Wittgenstein often takes a rather harsh look at 
science, but in doing so he is not challenging the fact that there are objective truths or that 
there is value in being objective. He is, rather, attempting to help us see the framework in 
which we think. All too often philosophers think with their heads without using their 
eyes, and Wittgenstein wants to make us aware of the potential hazards of this 
abstraction. He remarks on our academic neglect of fields unrelated to science to help us 
realize that scientific objectivity by itself cannot help us solve philosophical problems. 
Rather than attempting to solve them by producing formal theories, they are dissolved 
when we comprehend the world outside our minds by directly attending to it. 
Consider the following passage, "While still at school our children get taught that 
water consists of the gases hydrogen and oxygen, or sugar of carbon, hydrogen and 
oxygen. Anyone who doesn't understand is stupid. The most important questions are 
concealed.,,14 According to H.A. Nielsen ("A Meeting of Minds on Water"), 
13 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Culture and Value: A Selection from the Posthumous Remains. Trans. Peter
 
Winch. Ed. G. H. von Wright. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing, 1998. 23e.
 
14 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Culture and Value. Trans. Peter Winch. Ed. G.H. von Wright. Chicago,lL:
 
University of Chicago Press, 1980. 71e.
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Wittgenstein is saying that we are routinely taught to believe that we understand what 
water is when we understand its scientific definition, but in doing so, we forget the 
importance of how water interacts with the world. Nielsen asks, responding to someone 
who claims that "in science we try to get at water itself," "what on earth do you mean by 
'water itself?' When is it not itself? Perhaps when a chosen way of speaking drops 
existence out of account?"15 When we speak abstractly about water as the combination 
of two parts hydrogen to one part oxygen, we forget how water interacts with the world, 
and, consequently, we do not fully understand the different aspects of water. Instead of 
asking what water is composed of, Wittgenstein urges us to ask how it can be that 
hydrogen and oxygen can form water. Even if we cannot grasp the answer to this, we 
will at least bring a sense of wonder into our education. Maintaining this sense of 
wonder helps the subject recognize the limits of her understanding. This 'roughage' in 
each individual's intellect, to use Nielsen's terminology, is important since it jolts us 
back to reality from our place in the clouds of abstraction. 
Surprisingly, Wittgenstein advocates the importance of truths that cannot be 
reached by objective studies most clearly, in what is perhaps his most analytic work: The 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. He first explains that there are certain problems which 
haunt us; one of these is what he terms the problem of life. In presenting this problem, he 
writes, "Death is not an event in life: we do not live to experience death. If we take 
eternity to mean not infinite temporal duration but timelessness, then eternal life belongs 
to those who live in the present. Our life has no end in just the way in which our visual 
15 Nielsen, H.A. "A Meeting of Minds on Water." The Grammar ofthe Heart: New Essays in Moral 
Philosophy and Theology. Ed. Richard H. Bell. San Francisco, CA: Harper & Row, 1988. 78. 
15 
field has no limits.,,16 When we think of death as another stage in life, we are much 
more likely to wish the stage of life we are in will not end. This way of thinking about 
death is misguided; we should not live in regret, but rather, we should live in the present 
and focus all of our selves in the moment. When we are completely in the moment we 
are, in Kierkegaard's sense, absolutely passionate. A person in this state accepts the 
dialectic of her eternality and temporality, understanding that eternality and temporality 
are opposed to one another, and yet fully believing that she is simultaneously eternal and 
temporal. The subject thereby embraces her eternality while completely remaining 
within the temporal realm. She is wholly finite, but in her passion is absolutely infinite as 
well. Our life certainly will come to an end, in the sense that we are temporal beings. 
Yet, this ending is not a part of life, and when we live completely and infinitely in the 
present there can be no ending here. The problem of life as Wittgenstein addresses it is 
quite similar to the problem upon which Kierkegaard focuses so intently: the paradox of 
the self. 
Wittgenstein's approach to the problem oflife is not a solution in the traditional 
sense. It is better to view it as a dissolution of the problem. The problem ceases to exist, 
so a solution is not necessary. As we saw in my explication of Kierkegaard' s theory of 
truth as subjectivity, a person can only stand in relation to an essential truth in a moment 
of absolute faith. When the subject has faith, she understands the incompatibility of our 
eternality and temporality, for example, but nevertheless fully believes that we are 
simultaneously both eternal and temporal. The problem is thus dissolved for the person 
in faith. Though the person realizes that her belief that we are simultaneously eternal and 
16 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Trans. D. F. Pears & B.F. McGuinness. New 
York, N.Y.: Routledge Classics, 2001. 6.4311 
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temporal is paradoxical, she does not recognize it as being problematic. When we further 
apply Kierkegaard's model, we see that this dissolution of the problem cannot be 
expressed directly. It is impossible for the person of faith, whose faith necessarily 
transcends the universal and exists in the religious private, to explain her dissolution of 
the problem of life. She experiences the dissolution, but if she tried to explain it she 
would ultimately fail, as doing so requires her to rationalize her belief, which she cannot 
do; her relationship with truth is intensely personal. Just as the answer cannot be 
expressed by our language, the question itself cannot be properly expressed by our 
language. Wittgenstein therefore ends the Tractatus with his now infamous line, "What 
we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence."l? He thus emphasizes the existence 
of a distinction between sentences which represent states of affairs and sentences that do 
not fit this model, such as those dealing with ethics, the self, etc. Wittgenstein claims that 
sentences falling under the latter category are meaningless. A disregard for the proper 
boundary between the two categories leads philosophers down the wrong path. 
I have thus far shown that Wittgenstein held that there are certain essential truths 
which are paradoxical in nature. Furthermore, due to their nature, these truths must be 
understood subjectively. This entails understanding them as relating essentially to the 
self as both eternal and temporal. I have also shown that Wittgenstein believes these 
truths are very important in getting a clear picture of how we view the world. In the 
following sections, I explain how the picture of truth as inwardness allows us to see and 
re-evaluate our academic tendency toward absolute objectification. 
VI. Kierkegaard's Battle Against Over-Abstraction 
17 Ibid. 7 
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In explaining the significance ofWittgenstein's theory of inwardness to his 
overall philosophical project, two areas are of particular importance. First, I concentrate 
on Kierkegaard's battle against over-abstraction, which will help us understand the 
similar battle which Wittgenstein waged in his own time. Wittgenstein's rejection of 
logical atomism and Kierkegaard's call for a return of subjectivity to Christianity are 
familiar themes. But because they concentrate on such extremely different subject 
matters, it is often difficult to see that they were fighting very much the same battle 
against formalism and abstraction, albeit from different angles and with different motives 
in mind. IS Following my discussion of Kierkegaard, I look at Wittgenstein's attempt to 
point out the dangers of over-abstraction in philosophy. In doing so, I focus on his ladder 
analogy, which expresses Wittgenstein's attitudes toward inwardness and abstraction in 
philosophy. Since the analogy recurs in his later writings, it will help us trace how his 
ideas on these issues develop from his early to his later philosophy. 
In Philosophical Fragments and Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard 
is primarily concerned with the related questions of how Christianity ought to be defined 
and how individuals can enter into a relation to Christianity that allows them to grasp its 
truth. He concludes that to understand the truth of Christianity, we must understand it as 
a communication of our own qualitatively dialectical existence. This understanding, as 
I've explained, can only be reached through the absolute instance of inwardness: faith. 
For Kierkegaard, the problem with Christianity was essentially a problem of how we 
could reach an eternal truth, achieve eternal salvation, or simply accept our eternality and 
18 This is not to say that Kierkegaard was not interested in language or that Wittgenstein was not interested 
in Christianity. Their work in these areas is simply not as well-known. 
I 
18 
infiniteness as individual beings existing temporally. Thus, the problem of Christianity is 
a problem of how Christianity can relate to existing beings. 
In the late 1830s, Kierkegaard dedicated much of his time studying Hegel. He 
came away with an even stronger belief that a person must seek the essential truth of 
Christianity subjectively. Kierkegaard contended that for Hegel and many of his 
followers, the problem of Christianity was not a question of how an individual could 
relate to Christianity. The Hegelians aimed at a synthesis through the mediation of a 
supposed contradiction in Christianity, which they believed could be achieved through 
objective reasoning and thought. Because of the objective nature of Hegel's account, 
Kierkegaard thought that the question of an individual's relation to Christianity is denied 
in Hegel's theory. Moreover, Hegel's speculative theory denied the importance of faith 
and mitigated the paradox of receiving eternal truth while being in time. Kierkegaard, 
therefore, rejected Hegelian theory. Christianity, he asserted, is paradoxical; mediation is 
doomed to fail, particularly because it ignores the contrast of our individual, temporal 
existence and infinite, eternal salvation. Niels Thulstrop writes that for Kierkegaard, 
Hegelian "speculation represented a distorted concept of man and a distorted concept of 
Christianity." He continues, "even if speculation could speculatively apprehend 
everything possible other than the individual man and his correct relation to Christianity, 
Kierkegaard found it at best trivial and at worst, distracting from what was for him the 
only essential thing.,,19 Hegelianism flourished in Denmark during this period, so it was 
no surprise, given Kierkegaard's views toward the Hegelian theory of Christianity, that 
19 Thulstrup, Niels. Kierkegaard's Relation to Hegel. Trans. George L. Stengren. Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1980. 372. 
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he fought against speculative theory both directly and indirectly throughout much of his 
life. 
The dismissal of thought as a means to essential truth was part of the natural 
progression of Kierkegaard's theory. As he became more convinced that our dynamical 
existence was an essential part of the problem of Christianity, Kierkegaard realized that 
objective thinking, thinking that treated the changing self as an accidental factor, could 
not be a way of overcoming the problem and thereby reaching truth. He explains that "if 
there is to be any distinction at all between thought and action, the former must be 
assigned to possibility, indifference, the objective, and the latter to subjectivity.,,2o 
Alastair Hannay maintains that this passage captures an important difference 
between Kierkegaard and the early Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein holds that "the world is all 
that is the case," which defines reality as the object of thought. For Kierkegaard, reality 
is subjective and, thus, not the object of thought. It is, instead, the object of faith. 
Despite this difference, it is apparent that Wittgenstein follows Kierkegaard in drawing a 
sharp distinction between the sphere of objectivity and thought and the sphere of 
subjectivity and faith. Wittgenstein also advocates a change in philosophy that 
corresponds to this distinction. Let us trace this development from its initial stages, 
though. 
VII. Wittgenstein's Ladder 
In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein compares the process by which he attempts to get 
closer to these essential truths to climbing a ladder. He states: 
20 Qtd. in Hannay, Alastair. Kierkegaard. New York, N.Y.: Routledge, 1991. 153. 
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My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who 
understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has 
used them - as steps - to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, 
throwaway the ladder after he has climbed up it.i1 
Because what cannot be explained logically cannot be discussed directly, Wittgenstein 
must convey his thoughts on essential truth indirectly. The Tractatus itself is, at least in 
part, an instance of indirectly conveying truths. He states that everything that can be 
spoken of is in the world. Aesthetics, ethics, and metaphysics, Wittgenstein finally 
determines, fall outside the domain of language and so their claims are ineffable. The 
propositions that Wittgenstein employs in the Tractatus aim at something outside of this 
world, though. Wittgenstein's conclusion places the subject of the Tractatus in the 
category of the ineffable as well. For this reason, he labels his propositions 
'nonsensical.' When a person understands why one of the tasks of a philosopher is to 
make sure that language is used properly, she will necessarily repudiate the very 
propositions that have led her to believe this. In other words, she must "throwaway the 
ladder after [s]he has climbed up it. ,,22 This abandonment does not entail the uselessness 
of the propositions, as they lead us to a better conception of the paradox surrounding the 
mystical. When a person follows Wittgenstein's logic and understands why certain 
claims fall outside of language, she will understand why the mystical must be spoken of 
indirectly. It, too, falls outside of the domain of language and its claims are, according to 
Wittgenstein, nonsensical. This is not to say that mystical claims are without meaning or 
use. Just as Wittgenstein's propositions in the Tractatus are nonsensical yet useful, 
mystical language or indirect truths can still perform some function in our lives. 
21 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Trans. D. F. Pears & B.F. McGuinness. New 
York, NY.: Routledge Classics, 2001. 6.54 
22 Ibid. 6.54 
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Wittgenstein may have had this in mind when he urged us, "Don't for heaven's sake, be 
afraid of talking nonsense! Only do pay attention to your nonsense,,23 directly after his 
comment that "wisdom is something cold.... (Faith, on the other hand, a passion.),,24 
The ladder analogy is repeated in Culture and Value, in a remark from 1930. 
Wittgenstein's interest in the development of a conception of ineffable truths had not 
waned since the publication of the Tractatus, although many of his thoughts on language 
had changed considerably. Instead of throwing away the ladder when you have reached 
the top (i.e. an understanding), Wittgenstein writes that the ladder is altogether 
unnecessary, or at least of no concern to him. He writes: 
I might say, if the place I want to reach could only be climbed up to by a 
ladder, I would give up trying to get there. For the place to which I really 
have to go is one that I must actually be at already. Anything that can be 
reached with a ladder does not interest me.25 
This passage contains an implicit comment on his earlier work. When composing the 
Tractatus, Wittgenstein thought that philosophy must aim at the world. This seemed to 
coincide with his and Russell's highly formalistic theory of logical atomism, which held 
that one could describe the world and natural language through purely analytic or logical 
means. In the first analogy presented above, Wittgenstein refers to his argument in the 
Tractatus as a ladder. The propositions he presents are rungs which we climb up, to 
continue the analogy, and eventually throwaway when we have reached an 
understanding of what can be said with language. By 1930, he has rejected the notion of 
logical atomism that formed this 'ladder.' The steps are too formal and abstract. Even if 
23 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Culture and Value: A Selection from the Posthumous Remains. Trans. Peter
 
Winch. Ed. G. H. von Wright. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing, 1998. 64e.
 
24 Ibid. 64e.
 
25Ibid. 10e.
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a perfect formal language could be developed, it would fail to describe our own natural 
language. Abstraction removes philosophical theories from the way in which things in 
the world actually function. While Wittgenstein maintains that philosophy should aim at 
reflecting reality, he realizes in his later writings that the abstraction that results from the 
extreme objectivity of logical atomism prevents us from achieving this goal. 
Wittgenstein's later position regarding philosophical truth as concrete and non-
formal does not imply that one will always be capable of fully grasping truth in the way 
that one can grasp a logical theorem. Quite the opposite, Wittgenstein alludes to a 
continuing movement toward truth, i.e. truth as a process of striving. He writes directly 
after the (1930) ladder analogy: 
One movement orders one thought to the others in a series, the other keeps 
aiming at the same place. 
One movement constructs & takes (in hand) one stone after another, the 
other keeps reaching for the same one.26 
Whereas the Tractatus emphasized the abstract permanence of language, Wittgenstein's 
later philosophy promotes a more context-dependent philosophy, i.e. a philosophy of 
language where one must take instances of language's employment into account. As this 
requires a move toward the temporal, it entails a continued grasping for the truth. Truth 
is not necessarily something static for Wittgenstein. This thought is present even in his 
most famous of doctrines, "the meaning of a word is its use in the language.,,27 This is a 
radical departure from his statement in the Tractatus that a name's meaning is its 
26 Ibid. 1De.
 
27 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford, UK: Blackwell
 
Publishers, 2001. Remark 43.
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28
referent. In his theory of logical atomism, a person determines the meaning of the name 
completely objectively through knowing the referent of that name. Wittgenstein places 
the burden ofmeaning solely on the semantic content in his earlier work. In his 
Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein writes that by believing that the meaning of a 
name is its referent, one is "confound[ingJ the meaning of a name with the bearer of the 
name.,,29 Rather than defining the meaning of a particular name as a static and abstract 
relation between that name and its referent, he holds that a word's meaning is its use. As 
the use of a word changes in different situations and over time, we see that the truth of a 
sentence is dependent upon context. Wittgenstein has learned that absolute abstraction is 
a step in the wrong direction if we want to understand natural language. Just as we must 
look inward to grasp truths that relate essentially to the self, we must look at the concrete 
use of a sentence in order to grasp the truth of the proposition expressed. I am reminded 
here ofNielsen's remark that a person does not understand water simply because she 
knows its scientific definition. A person must look at water's functions and use in the 
world to fully grasp the truth about it. When we think about the chemical composition of 
water, we tend to forget about water as it exists and interacts with the world, but this 
knowledge is most important. Similarly, when we think of a word as a symbol attached 
to a referent, we tend to neglect our actual usage of the word in language. Paradox and 
inwardness are often overlooked because they are rarely mentioned directly, but the 
reader could maintain that Wittgenstein steps away from abstraction, in the direction of 
Kierkegaard's subjective, and lands in the ever-changing concrete. 
28 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Trans. D. F. Pears & B.F. McGuinness. New 
York, N.Y.: Routledge Classics, 2001. 3.203 
29 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford, UK: Blackwell 
Publishers,2001. Remark 40. 
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VIII. Conclusion 
Wittgenstein took Kierkegaard's devotion to subjective knowledge to heart in his 
assessment of contemporary philosophy (including his own!). More specifically, he 
noticed a trend in analytic philosophy that moved toward absolute abstraction. When 
Gottleib Frege, for example, found that language did not always correspond to his logical 
theory of how language functioned, he sometimes claimed that the lack of 
correspondence was not a fault of his logical theory; rather, it occurred because we were 
misusing language or because language was imperfect. This practice of extreme 
objectification seemed counterintuitive to Wittgenstein. He wrote fervently that 
philosophy, if it was to have any merit or success, must show the world for what it is. 
Ultimately, when we rely solely on abstraction, we climb ladders above the clouds, and 
we become lost in their opacity. 
•
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